Fuhito Kojima
Assistant Professor
Contact Info:
fkojima@stanford.edu
http://sites.google.com/site/fuhitokojimaeconomics/
Page in Stanford Directory
Phone:
Office: Landau 239
Office hours: By appointment
Interests
- Research: Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Market Design, Political Economics
- Current Research: Analysis of matching/assignment mechanisms in large economies, practical market design for schools
- Teaching: Game Theory, Market Design
- Professional Affiliations:
AEA, Econometric Society
Recent Publications
(1) "Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets," 2008, joint with Parag A. Pathak, forthcoming in American Economic Review.
(2) "Risk-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics in N-Player Games," 2006, Journal of Economic Theory 128, pp 255-273.
(3) "Group Incentive Compatibility for Matching with Contracts," 2008, joint with John William Hatfield, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.
(4) "A Theory of Hung Juries and Informative Voting," 2009, joint with Yuki Takagi, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.
List of Stanford Working Papers
Current Courses
| Autumn | ECON 285 Auctions, Bargaining, and Pricing |
| Winter | ECON 289 Game Theory |
Education
Harvard University, Ph.D. Economics, University of Tokyo, B. A. Economics