Session 7: Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets

Wednesday, August 18, 2021, 9am - Friday, August 20, 2021, 5pm
Organized by
  • Simon Board, University of California, Los Angeles
  • Gonzalo Cisternas, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • George Georgiadis, Northwestern University
  • Mira Frick, Yale University
  • Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford GSB
  • Takuo Sugaya, Stanford GSB
Application Deadline
April 15, 2021 at 11:59 PM PDT

The idea of this session is to bring together microeconomic theorists working on dynamic games and contracts with more applied theorists working in macro, finance, organizational economics, and other fields. First, this is a venue to discuss the latest questions and techniques facing researchers working in dynamic games and contracts. Second, we wish to foster interdisciplinary discussion between scholars working on parallel topics in different disciplines, in particular, helping raise awareness among theorists of the open questions in other fields.

This is a continuation of successful SITE annual sessions 2013-2020. In previous years, we attracted people from economics, finance, operations research, political economy, and other related fields, ranging from Ph.D. students to senior professors. We hope to have a similar number of attendees this year as in the past. Specific topics likely to be covered include repeated and stochastic games, dynamic optimal contracts, dynamic market pricing, reputation, search, and learning and experimentation.