**Bridging Level-k to Nash Equilibrium**

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**Abstract:** We propose a new solution concept, NLK, which connects Nash Equilibrium (NE) and $level_k$ model. It allows a player in a game to believe that her opponent may be either less, or as sophisticated as she is, a view with strong support in psychology. We apply it to data from four published papers on static, dynamic and auction games. NLK provides different solutions than those of NE and $level_k$, and even a simple version of it explains the experimental data better. We discuss possible extensions to games with more than two players and heterogeneous beliefs.

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I also plan, if time permits, to briefly describe current work that is related to NLK and also to Obviously Strategy Proof.