Abstract: Can small search costs that constrain information acquisition and monitoring across the administrative hierarchy provide some explanation for poor government performance in public service delivery in the developing world? We conducted a large-scale field experiment across the entirety of two Indian states to examine this question, where we randomized bureaucrat access to a mobile-phone-based management and monitoring platform for wage payments in the world’s largest workfare program (MGNREGA). The platform lowered costs of accessing information about the status of pending payments and identifying subordinate employees who need to act. Our experiment also randomly varied which level of the administrative hierarchy received e-platform access – senior and/or intermediate officials. Overall, we find that providing platform access at either level of the hierarchy leads to quicker and less variable processing times in areas with worse baseline delays. We also find evidence of cross-level treatment interactions. The improvements in payment processing times achieved through usage of the tool point to the potential for service delivery improvements enabled by technology now widely available in capacity-constrained settings.