
SITE 2026 Conference
Call For Papers
Stanford Economics is proud to host its annual Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) Conference from July 20 to September 11, 2026. SITE sponsors sessions that encompass both economic theory and empirical work and cover a broad range of topics. It brings together established and emerging scholars to present leading-edge economic research, to educate, and to collaborate.
Paper Submission
To ensure a productive and engaging experience for all participants, presenters are encouraged and expected to attend and participate in the entirety of their respective sessions.
In addition, SITE will only cover a portion of travel expenses of selected presenters. Local presenters will receive no funding support.
For questions, please contact us at siteworkshop [at] stanford.edu (siteworkshop[at]stanford[dot]edu).
If you can no longer find a submission link for a specific session, this indicates that the submission window for that session has closed.
Submissions are closed for the following sessions:
- Empirical Implementation of Theoretical Models of Strategic Interaction and Dynamic Behavior (July 20-21)
- Financial Regulation (July 22-24)
- Experimental Economics (Aug. 6-7)
- Gender (Aug. 10-11)
- Dynamic Games, Contracts, and Markets (Aug. 17-19)
- China in the Global Economy (Aug.17-19)
- Political Economic Theory (Aug. 20-21)
- Market Failures and Public Policy (Aug. 26-27)
- Psychology and Economics (Sep. 3-4)
Session 3: Applied Artificial Intelligence in Macro-Finance
This session will bring together researchers who are applying frontier AI and machine learning methods to improve measurement, policy analysis, and modeling in macroeconomics and finance. A central theme is the interaction between methodological innovation and economic insight: when and how does incorporating applied AI methods sharpen our understanding of macro-financial mechanisms? We welcome a broad range of perspectives to enrich this discussion.
Paper submission deadline: May 11, 2026
- Christopher Clayton (Yale University)
- Antonio Coppola (Stanford University)
Session 4: Social Structure and Economic Development
The conference seeks to bring together scholars, and in particular, encourage interactions between young scholars and mentors, that study the crucial role that social structure plays in understanding economic development. Social structure is a broad concept encompassing relational contracts, cultural and ethno-religious ties, the interaction of formal and informal markets, as well as formal and informal governance.
Paper submission deadline:: May 14, 2026
- Arun Chandrasekhar (Stanford University)
- Tishara Garg (Stanford University)
- Melanie Morten (Stanford University)
- Dev Patel (Brown University)
- Ambra Seck (Harvard University)
Session 5: The Micro and Macro of Labor Markets
The idea of this session is to bring together labor economists and macroeconomists with interests in labor markets with two goals. The first goal is to be a venue to discuss the latest research about labor markets. The second goal is to promote intellectual exchange among scholars working on similar topics, but with different approaches. Specific topics will depend on the submissions. The submitting author is by default the presenting author. If someone other than the submitting author would be presenting, that should be noted with the submission and we reserve the right to withdraw an acceptance if we are not notified of such a discrepancy.
Paper submission deadline: May 19, 2026
- Pauline Carry (Princeton University)
- Gregor Jarosch (Duke University)
- Richard Rogerson (Princeton University)
- Isaac Sorkin (Stanford University)
Session 8: Public Economics
This session will bring together researchers studying how tax policies and government spending programs shape economic outcomes. We welcome submissions examining the efficiency and distributional effects of public interventions, as well as how these policies influence the behavior of households and firms. Studies using reduced-form, structural, experimental, or quasi-experimental approaches to address core questions in public economics are welcome. Submissions from scholars at all career stages are encouraged.
Paper submission deadline: May 25, 2026
- Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato (Stanford University)
- Patrick Kennedy (University of California, Los Angeles)
- Rebecca Lester (Stanford University)
- Felipe Lobel (Duke University)
- Juliana Londoño Vélez (University of California, Los Angeles)
Session 12: Banking and the Deposit Franchise
Bank deposits are widely viewed as a stable and valuable funding source, yet recent events—most notably the 2022–23 tightening cycle and the regional banking crisis—have renewed questions about how sticky deposits really are, how their value is created, and when that value can disappear abruptly. This session brings together recent empirical and theoretical work that reexamines the deposit franchise as a central determinant of banks’ interest-rate risk exposure, funding stability, and monetary transmission.
The session focuses on three interrelated themes:
(i) how deposit stickiness is measured and inferred from data,
(ii) the mechanisms through which banks build and maintain deposit franchises (pricing, geography, technology, and balance-sheet choices), and
(iii) the implications of deposit franchise value for risk-taking, fragility, and regulation.
Paper submission deadline: June 8, 2026
- Arvind Krishnamurthy (Stanford University)
- Peter DeMarzo (Stanford University)
- Zhiguo He (Stanford University)
- Konstantin Milbradt (University of California, Los Angeles)
Session 14: The Economics of Transparency
The idea of this SITE session is to bring together theorists and empiricists working on topics of the economics of information transparency and disclosure across a wide range of fields including accounting, economics, finance, and law. We have two broad goals with this conference. The first is to provide a venue to discuss the latest frontier of research questions and techniques facing researchers studying transparency and disclosure topics across a variety of markets. This is particularly important at a time where regulators across the globe are increasingly relying on disclosure regulation to achieve various goals, including, for example, ensuring the stability of the banking sector, fostering quality through competition in the healthcare sector, improving the diversity of firms’ leadership positions, and combating climate change. Second, we wish to foster interdisciplinary discussion between scholars working on parallel topics in different disciplines and help raise awareness among theorists and empiricists alike of the open questions in other fields. This interdisciplinary collaboration is necessary to best design information disclosure policies embedded in complex legal institutions.
Paper submission deadline: June 11, 2026
- Thomas Bourveau, Columbia University
- Ilan Guttman, New York University
- John Kepler, Stanford University
- Kevin Smith, Stanford University
Session 15: Causes and Consequences of Misallocation: Theory and Empirics
The efficient allocation of resources across firms and sectors is crucial for aggregate productivity and economic growth. In an ideal world without frictions, resources would flow to their most productive uses, but what happens when there are barriers to this efficient reallocation? Firms can face constraints in accessing capital, technology, or skilled labor, or when distortionary policies create wedges in marginal products across firms. Furthermore, the persistence of productivity differences across countries suggests that misallocation may be a key driver of development gaps. How do various market frictions and policy distortions contribute to resource misallocation, and what are their quantitative implications for aggregate productivity? This session will bridge theoretical frameworks with empirical evidence, combining insights from firm dynamics, finance, and macroeconomics to deepen our understanding of how misallocation shapes economic performance and what policies might help address it.
Paper submission deadline: June 15, 2026
- Michael Blank (Stanford University)
- Pete Klenow (Stanford University)
- Adrien Matray (Federal Reserve of Atlanta)
- Sara Moreira (Northwestern University)
Session 16: Economics of Health Inequality
The workshop will feature a wide range of methodological approaches, including empirical analysis using administrative and experimental data, structural modeling, and theoretical frameworks, to study the sources, consequences, and persistence of health inequalities across populations. By fostering dialogue between applied and theoretical researchers, the conference will tackle hard, policy-relevant questions at the intersection of health, inequality, and economic institutions, with particular attention to mechanisms that inform the design of effective and equitable health and social policies.
Paper submission deadline: June 15, 2026
- Marcella Alsan (Stanford University)
- Aline Bütikofer (Norwegian School of Economics)
- Petra Persson (Stanford University)
Session 17: The Macroeconomics of Uncertainty and Volatility
The session will cover recent work on the causes and effects of changes in volatility and uncertainty in the aggregate economy, which is incredibly topical in light of the current events such as tariffs, fiscal and regulatory policy changes, and geopolitical tension. This session will focus on measuring changes in uncertainty, evaluating its impact on the US and global economy, and discussing policy responses. The mix of academics and policy makers across multiple institutions reflects this broad interest. The session will aim to include about 20 recent papers on these topics, with as in prior years a mix of theoretical and empirical papers, junior and senior presenters.
Paper submission deadline: June 17, 2026
- Nicholas Bloom, Stanford University
- Steve Davis, Stanford University
- Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, University of Pennsylvania
- Zheng Liu, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
- Bo Sun, University of Virginia
- Nancy Xu, Boston College
Session 19: Fiscal Sustainability
Several countries have now record high levels of public debt that are comparable to the ones inherited from WWII. This creates challenges for both fiscal sustainability and the conduct of monetary policy. This session aims to bring together scholars working at the intersection of monetary policy, fiscal policy, fiscal sustainability, asset pricing, central bank independence, and the valuation of government debt. What role do central banks play in creating fiscal space for governments? Is there a possibility of fiscal dominance going forward? How does this possibility affect asset prices and the creation of safe assets? Could the erosion of the U.S. fiscal position threaten its reserve currency role? What are the consequences of the threats to central bank independence? Both applied and theoretical contributions are welcome. The goal is to have a lively discussion enriched by a variety of perspectives.
Paper submission deadline: June 2, 2026
- Francesco Bianchi (John Hopkins University)
- Luigi Bocola (Stanford University)
- Hanno Lustig (Stanford University)
Session 20: Models of the Labor Market and the Aggregate Economy: New Developments and Policy Implications
In the past few years, there has been a burgeoning interest in the use of general equilibrium models disciplined by micro data to carefully analyze important labor market phenomena and policies, both at business-cycle frequencies and over long horizons. The use of these models to understand the behavior of labor markets and the aggregate economy over time, so as to conduct comprehensive quantitative analyses of the underlying mechanisms and proposed reforms, is still at an early stage, however. The goal of this session is to bring together a diverse group of scholars, both young and established, engaged in theoretical or quantitative frontier research in this broad area.
Paper submission deadline: June 24, 2026
- Patrick Kehoe (Stanford University)
- Elena Pastorino (Stanford University)
- Richard Rogerson (Princeton University)
- Robert Shimer (University of Chicago)
SITE is funded by grants from the National Science Foundation with additional support from the Stanford School of Humanities & Sciences Department of Economics, the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), and the Stanford Graduate School of Business.